The Financial Crisis and the Changing Profile of Mortgage Arrears in Ireland. ESRI Research Notes 2014/4/2 by Fahy, Mike et al.
This Note has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does not itself take institutional policy 
positions. Research Notes are subject to refereeing prior to publication. The authors are solely responsible 
for the content and the views expressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
ESRI RESEARCH NOTE 
 
The Financial Crisis and the Changing Profile of 
Mortgage Arrears in Ireland  
Mike Fahy, Conor O’Toole and Rachel Slaymaker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOI  https://doi.org/10.26504/rn20180402 
 
 
This Open Access work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.  
 
 
 
  
1 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE CHANGING PROFILE OF MORTGAGE 
ARREARS  
 
* Mike Fahy, Conor O’Toole and Rachel Slaymaker1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding which households go into mortgage arrears during both boom and 
bust periods in Ireland is of critical importance to ensure suitable policies are 
deployed to safeguard future financial stability. Many of the difficulties in Ireland 
arose from the loosening of underwriting standards by financial institutions. This 
led to excessive household leverage ratios and provided households with limited 
buffers with which to absorb shocks (McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017; Lydon and 
McCann, 2017). The joint effects of labour market difficulties and large falls in 
house prices led to a situation where nearly one-in-five mortgage loans was in 
arrears at the height of the crisis (McCarthy, 2014).  
 
To shed light on the drivers of the arrears crisis, a series of studies have explored 
the relative effects of equity shocks and affordability shocks on Irish mortgage 
holders. Using loan-level data from the Central Bank of Ireland, Kelly and 
O’Malley (2016) and Lydon and McCarthy (2013) estimate double-trigger type 
models which find a role for both the loan-to-value ratio and the unemployment 
rate in driving mortgage default. These studies, and notable others such as 
Gaffney et al. (2014), formed the basis for the mortgage stress test framework for 
loan-loss forecasting that the Central Bank now uses. Recent research by 
O’Malley (2018) also provides judicial and legislative motives for default.  
 
One challenge with existing datasets has been a lack of up-to-date information on 
borrower income which is unavailable in loan-level data. To address this gap in 
the literature, McCarthy (2014) undertook a specific survey to capture current 
income information for mortgage holders and link it back to the loan data. This 
research found that labour shocks and fragile employment explained a large 
share of arrears cases in Ireland.  
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While these studies have provided a very thorough explanation of the arrears 
crisis since 2010, no research has explored the difference in the type of 
household that went into arrears during the systemic crisis relative to the pre-
crisis period. This is mainly due to the lack of loan-level data for the pre-crisis 
period. One notable exception is McCarthy and McQuinn (2011) who focus on 
income in the period just before the severe crisis period 2009/2010. However, 
documentation of the change in mortgage arrears over the crisis period in terms 
of household composition and other characteristics is still missing.  
 
To address this gap in the literature, in this Research Note, we build on the 
existing work by exploring whether the composition of borrowers who went into 
arrears during the height of the financial crisis was different from those who were 
in arrears in the pre-crisis period. We draw on the Irish Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC) which began in 2003 and is conducted by the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) on an annual basis. Most importantly, this dataset contains 
a wealth of information on both mortgage debt and socio-economic 
characteristics, enabling us to explore which types of household experienced 
mortgage distress both before and during the crisis.  
 
There are good economic reasons to expect a priori that the types of household 
who experience mortgage repayment distress in normal economic times may 
differ from those who are affected during a systemic crisis following an extensive 
credit boom. For example, in a more stable economic environment, re-
employment probabilities following a job loss are likely to be greater. Individuals 
most likely to experience arrears problems during normal economic times may be 
those whose skill profile does not fit the labour demanded, those who are in low 
paid or fragile employment, and those suffering from adverse personal 
circumstances such as ill health or family problems.  
 
In a systemic crisis, where leverage ratios have increased considerably in the 
preceding period, labour shocks may also permeate to groups in the economy 
that would not be affected in normal times. This may give rise to a very different 
profile of borrowers who enter arrears. Understanding which households will 
likely experience distress across the economic cycle is critical to designing 
structural policies to moderate loan arrears in good and bad times.  
 
We find that in the pre-crisis period, those households in mortgage arrears were 
more likely to have suffered very severe economic, social or other personal 
difficulties including ill health or divorce or separation. Arrears cases were also 
more likely to come from the lower end of the income distribution. Housing 
equity considerations (negative equity) had no bearing on default as house prices 
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were rising. In contrast, during the systemic crisis, equity considerations played a 
role and defaults increased to a greater extent amongst higher income groups 
and those without health or other personal difficulties.  
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand what the drivers of 
default will be in non-crisis times. As the Irish economy recovers, it is likely that 
there will be new default cases. However, the reasons for these may be more 
down to unanticipated personal difficulties rather than broad equity or labour 
market shocks. This may require a different policy response for these households.  
 
This Note is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Section 3 profiles the types of households in arrears before and during 
the financial crisis. Section 4 considers whether financial distress for households 
goes beyond mortgage arrears and also affects their repayment of other loan 
items and bills and Section 5 concludes.  
2. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
To understand the household types which typically fall into mortgage arrears we 
draw on the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). The SILC provides a 
comprehensive micro-level dataset surveying income and living conditions across 
different types of households (see CSO, 2016). As a survey of private households, 
it is voluntary and is carried out under EU legislation. In Ireland, the survey is 
conducted on an annual basis by the CSO and, while it is primarily focused on 
collecting information used to derive indicators of poverty, deprivation and social 
exclusion, the survey also contains a significant amount of information for each 
household on home ownership, details of mortgage debt, monthly mortgage 
instalments and arrears. In particular, we use information on whether households 
went into mortgage arrears in the last 12 months as our indicator of mortgage 
arrears. 
 
While previous work (Kelly and O’Malley, 2016; Lydon and McCarthy, 2013) has 
used loan-level data to document the extent of arrears in Ireland, these papers 
focus exclusively on the post-crisis period. Furthermore, as these are loan-level 
data, they do not contain household level characteristics. Using SILC data from 
2004-2013 therefore provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the 
incidence of arrears across different types of households and to explore whether 
the composition of borrowers who were in arrears during the height of the 
financial crisis was different from those who went into arrears in the pre-crisis 
period.  
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FIGURE 1 PRIVATE DWELLING HOMES MORTGAGE ARREARS IN IRELAND: A COMPARISON 
BETWEEN SILC AND CBI DATA 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office EU-SILC data, and Central Bank of Ireland, Residential Mortgage Arrears data. 
 
Before we use the SILC data for any analysis, we first want to examine how well 
the arrears information correlates with the equivalent Central Bank of Ireland 
data used in existing studies. In Figure 1 we compare the proportion of 
households in mortgage arrears in the SILC data2 to both the Central Bank of 
Ireland’s private dwelling homes (PDH) total arrears outstanding data series and 
the CBI’s over 90 days outstanding data series. The trend in the SILC mortgage 
arrears data is very similar to the trends in both the CBI’s over 90 days 
outstanding data series and the CBI’s PDH total arrears outstanding series. In fact 
from 2009 to 2016, we find that there is an 82 per cent correlation between the 
CBI’s 90 days in arrears data series and the SILC arrears data, and an 88 per cent 
correlation between the CBI’s total outstanding arrears series and the SILC 
arrears data.  
 
 
                                                          
 
2  Information on mortgages in the SILC data refers only to private dwelling homes; it does not contain information on 
buy-to-let or investment properties or on second homes.   
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FIGURE 2 NEGATIVE EQUITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN SILC AND CBI DATA  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office EU-SILC data, and Central Bank of Ireland data. 
 
In Figure 2 we compare the proportion of households in negative equity in the 
SILC data to the equivalent Central Bank of Ireland figures.3 We can see from 
Figure 2 that the correlation between the two series is very high, with a 
correlation coefficient of 99 per cent during the period 2011-2014 for which we 
have data for both series.  
 
The strong correlations between the SILC and CBI data, both in terms of the share 
of households in arrears and the share of households in negative equity, provides 
a solid empirical basis for using the SILC data to analyse and profile the 
demographic and other household level characteristics behind mortgage arrears 
in Ireland. We can, thus, provide new additional insights into the evolution of 
arrears over time in Ireland. Our particular focus is on examining the periods 
before which Central Bank data are available.  
 
In Figure 3 we plot the regional variation in mortgage arrears during non-crisis 
and crisis years. For the purposes of our analysis throughout this Note, we define 
the non-crisis period as 2004-2009 and the crisis period as 2010-2013. While the 
financial crisis began in 2008, in Ireland the mortgage arrears crisis really began 
to take hold from 2010 onwards. Prior to the crisis there was no significant 
geographical variation in the proportion of households in arrears, with the arrears 
 
                                                          
 
3  We compare the SILC data with the CBI series of the previous year because the CBI negative equity data are reported 
at the end of Q4 each year, whereas in SILC, respondents are interviewed throughout the year and asked to report on 
the previous 12 months. E.g. we compare CBI Q4 2011 with SILC 2012. 
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rate varying between 1 per cent to 4.5 per cent for all regions. An exception to 
this trend is seen in the Western region, which had a slightly higher rate of 6.7 
per cent (see Figure 3a).  
 
In contrast, in Figure 3b we observe significant geographical variation in the 
arrears rate during the crisis period (2010-2013). Although we observe a higher 
arrears rate in all regions, we note the rate was substantially higher in the Border 
and South-East regions where just over one-fifth of households were in arrears, 
and the Midland region with just under 20 per cent of households. These areas, in 
particular, saw a huge construction boom in the early 2000s, with house prices 
increasing substantially relative to incomes. The economies in these areas were 
also heavily reliant on domestic, non-traded products and firms, meaning that 
these areas were particularly vulnerable to large unemployment and income 
shocks during the crisis.  
 
FIGURE 3 SHARE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN MORTGAGE ARREARS BY REGION 
  
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
 
 
In Figure 4 we explore the correlation in the regional patterns of both 
unemployment and negative equity in Ireland, as unemployment and equity 
shocks are shown to be two important drivers of arrears in the existing literature. 
Figure 4a reinforces the finding that between 2010 and 2013 the Midland, Border 
and South-East regions had much higher levels of mortgage arrears, ranging from 
19 per cent to 21 per cent, compared to 10 per cent to 13 per cent in other 
b. 2010-2013 a. 2004-2009 
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regions. During this period, the share of households in negative equity was 
particularly high in the Midland and to a lesser extent in the Border region. Figure 
4b firstly shows the large increases in unemployment in all regions between the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods. Secondly it shows that in the South-East, 
unemployment, in particular, was high between 2010 and 2013, at approximately 
18 per cent. These correlations suggest that the reasons why households fall into 
arrears may differ across regions. 
 
FIGURE 4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARREARS, NEGATIVE EQUITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY 
REGION 
a) Negative Equity 2010-2013 
 
 
b) Unemployment 2004-2009 and 2010-2013 
 
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
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3.  PROFILING ARREARS ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS BEFORE AND DURING 
THE CRISIS 
In this section we explore whether the composition of borrowers who were in 
arrears during the height of the financial crisis was different from those who were 
in arrears in the pre-crisis period. Table 1 presents the predicted probability that 
a household is in arrears for a series of household characteristics in the non-crisis 
period (2004-2009) and crisis period (2010-2013), conditional on controlling for 
other household characteristics.4 Extensive mortgage modification programmes 
came into operation in Ireland after 2013 (see Danne and McGuinness, 2016; and 
McCann, 2017). As these modification programmes are not captured in the SILC 
data, we exclude households in the 2014-2016 waves for the remainder of our 
analysis.5 This is due to the fact that while these households may no longer be in 
arrears due to the modifications, they may still be in significant financial distress. 
In any case, our primary focus in this Note is to explore the differences between 
the composition of borrowers in arrears prior to and during the crisis, for which 
we do not require data from these more recent waves.  
 
Focusing first on the non-crisis years, it is clear that higher predicted probabilities 
of arrears are associated with particular high risk groups, such as those without 
third-level education, households in the lowest 40 per cent of the income 
distribution and especially single adult households with children. In addition, we 
can see that households who suffered an employment, marital or health shock 
were more likely to be in arrears. Between 2004-2009, controlling for other 
characteristics, unemployed households had an 11 per cent likelihood of being in 
mortgage arrears, along with 4 per cent likelihood for those who had suffered 
divorce, separation or became widowed, and a 15 per cent chance for households 
who reported experiencing bad health.  
 
Turning now to the crisis years, from the second column of Table 1 it is clear that 
the likelihood of being in arrears increased for all household types. However, 
from the final column of Table 1 we observe much larger relative increases in 
arrears for households with substantially different characteristics. More precisely, 
the number of employed households in arrears increased five-fold, while 
younger, healthier, and better educated households saw the largest rise in 
arrears, with a seven-fold increase for households with third-level education.  
 
 
                                                          
 
4  We estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probabilities that a household of that characteristic is in 
arrears, holding the other variables at their means.  
5  The SILC data do not capture modifications such as arrears capitalisations and term extensions.  
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Finally, as shown in the final column of Table 1, we observe an almost three-fold 
rise in the arrears rate for households with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 80 
or, put differently, we see the importance of the equity channel coming into play 
in the crisis period. Exploring this in more detail, in Figure 5 we see that prior to 
2009 virtually no households were in negative equity. This corresponds with our 
findings in Table 1 that households in arrears in the non-crisis period tended to be 
those who had suffered an adverse employment, marital or health shock. After 
2009 there was a sharp rise in the share of households in negative equity, and 
this was much greater for households in arrears, peaking at 45-46 per cent 
between 2011 and 2013. Households in negative equity may be more likely to go 
into arrears for several reasons. First, a household may decide to stop making 
mortgage payments when the value of the debt is greater than the value of the 
property, a so-called strategic default. Second, a household faced with both a 
negative equity and an affordability shock may be unable to make mortgage 
payments and unable to sell the property, forcing them into arrears.  
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TABLE 1  MORTGAGE ARREARS BY HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS  
2004-2013  
Characteristic 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2004-2009  
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears 
2010-2013  
Percentage 
Point 
Difference 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
Age     
18-35 0.016 0.135 0.119 743.8 
36-50 0.018 0.083 0.065 361.1 
51+ 0.020 0.105 0.085 425.0 
Marital Status     
Married 0.015 0.090 0.075 500.0 
Single 0.021 0.109 0.088 419.0 
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 0.040 0.169 0.129 322.5 
Employment Status     
Employed 0.014 0.086 0.072 514.3 
Unemployed 0.108 0.217 0.109 100.9 
Other 0.031 0.128 0.097 312.9 
Education     
Primary 0.027 0.185 0.158 585.2 
Secondary 0.025 0.108 0.083 332.0 
Third-level 0.011 0.089 0.078 709.1 
Household Composition     
1 adult, no children 0.012 0.048 0.036 300.0 
1 adult, with children 0.087 0.105 0.018 20.7 
2 adults, no children 0.011 0.069 0.058 527.3 
 2 adults, with children 0.023 0.140 0.117 508.7 
Health Status     
Very good/good 0.016 0.091 0.075 468.8 
Fair 0.045 0.189 0.144 320.0 
Bad/very bad 0.151 0.306 0.155 102.6 
Income Distribution     
<p(40) 0.044 0.278 0.234 531.8 
p(40)-p(60) 0.030 0.153 0.123 410.0 
>p(60) 0.013 0.069 0.056 430.8 
Unconditional Proportion of 
Households in Arrears (%) 
0.032 0.128 
0.096 300.0 
Unconditional Proportion of 
Households with LTV>80 (%) 
0.039 0.148 
0.109 279.5 
No. Obs. 6,646 4,335   
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data. 
Note:  For Columns 1 and 2 we estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probability of arrears for each household 
characteristic, while holding the other variables at their means. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level, except the coefficient on ‘1 adult, no children’ in the 2004-2009 period which is significant at the 5 per cent level. In 
addition, in the last two rows we present the unconditional proportion, i.e. the simple mean, of households in arrears and 
with an LTV>80 as additional information. The mean proportion of households with an LTV>80 is based on a smaller sample 
(4,055 and 2,966 observations respectively) due to missing data. 
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FIGURE 5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGATIVE EQUITY AND ARREARS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data  
Note:  In the period prior to 2008, the actual level of negative equity in Ireland was (near) zero due to rising house prices. We therefore 
have (near) zero values for these years in our data. Due to the small number of households in arrears in certain years prior to 
2009, these observations are simply reported as 0 for 2004-2008.  
4. MORTGAGE ARREARS AND BROADER HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
In addition to examining the differences between the types of households going 
into arrears in the non-crisis and crisis periods, one additional question of interest 
is to what extent distress in the mortgage market is accompanied by broader 
household financial difficulties. In addition to the basic socio-economic 
characteristics presented so far, the SILC data also contain a series of information 
on broader household financial distress. This provides us with the unique 
opportunity to assess the extent to which distress in the mortgage market was 
accompanied by broader household financial distress.  
 
In Table 2 we can see that in the crisis period, controlling for other characteristics, 
more than one-third of households in arrears on their utility bills and 45 per cent 
of those in consumer loan arrears were also in mortgage arrears. Furthermore, 
one-fifth of households having difficulty or great difficulty making ends meet, 14 
per cent of households unable to save income regularly, and 17 per cent of 
households who were unable to take a family holiday, were in arrears in the crisis 
period. These findings are significant as they clearly show the existence of 
additional broader household financial distress during the crisis period, over and 
above the issue of being in mortgage arrears. However, from the final column of 
Table 2, it is also clear that we observe larger relative increases in arrears for 
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households not in broader financial difficulties. This is consistent with our 
findings in Table 1 that during the systemic crisis, the risk of falling into arrears 
spread throughout society.  
 
TABLE 2  HOUSEHOLDS IN MORTGAGE ARREARS 2004-2013 – BROADER FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
Characteristic 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2004-2009 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Arrears  
2010-2013 
Difference Percentage Change (%) 
Utilities Arrears in last 12 months     
Yes 0.122 0.349 0.227 186.1 
No 0.007 0.096 0.089 1,271.4 
 Consumer Loan Arrears in last 12 months    
Yes 0.061 0.447 0.386 632.8 
No 0.007 0.104 0.097 1,385.7 
Can Regularly Save Some Income     
Yes 0.006 0.114 0.108 1,800.0 
No 0.011 0.141 0.13 1,181.8 
Ability to Make Ends Meet     
With great difficulty/difficulty 0.024 0.19 0.166 691.7 
With some difficulty 0.008 0.100 0.092 1,150.0 
Fairly easily/easily 0.005 0.101 0.096 1,920.0 
Very easily 0.004 0.110 0.106 2,650.0 
Ability to take Annual Family Holiday     
Yes 0.007 0.112 0.105 1,500.0 
No 0.017 0.167 0.15 882.4 
No. Obs. 6,645 4,333   
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC data.  
Note:  For Columns 1 and 2 we estimate probit regressions and report the predicted probability of arrears for each household 
characteristic, while holding the other variables at their means. These regressions also include the household characteristics 
shown in Table 1. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, except the coefficient on ‘yes-consumer 
loan arrears’ in the 2004-2009 period which is significant at the 5 per cent level, and on ‘very easily able to make ends meet’ 
in the 2004-2009 period which is not statistically significant. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this Research Note we provide an examination of the socio-economic 
characteristics of borrowers in mortgage arrears in Ireland. More specifically, we 
explore the change in composition of these borrowers between those in arrears 
in the pre-crisis years and those who went into arrears during the financial crisis.  
 
In Section 2 we show that the SILC data are highly correlated with the CBI data on 
Irish mortgage arrears, and therefore provide a suitable dataset with which to 
analyse and profile the demographic and other household level characteristics 
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behind mortgage arrears in Ireland over the period 2004-2013. From a regional 
perspective, we present descriptive evidence showing that prior to the crisis 
there was no significant geographical variation in the proportion of households in 
arrears; however, in the crisis years we show mortgage arrears rates were 
significantly higher in the Border, Midland and South-East regions. Taking a closer 
look at the equity and unemployment channels which act as a catalyst for a 
household falling into arrears, we show that the relative importance of these 
channels differs across regions. 
 
In Section 3 we find that prior to the crisis, households in mortgage arrears were 
typically those who had suffered unemployment, marital and health shocks, as 
well as particular risk groups such as lone parents. However, during the systemic 
crisis, the risk of falling into arrears spread throughout society, and in fact 
healthier, younger, more highly educated, employed households saw the largest 
increases in incidence of arrears.  
 
Finally, in Section 4 we show that households in mortgage arrears also suffer 
from broader financial distress. In particular, households in arrears on utility bills 
and consumer loans have a much higher likelihood of also being in mortgage 
arrears. However, during the systemic crisis, the risk of falling into arrears spread 
throughout society, and in fact households not in consumer loan or hire purchase 
arrears, as well as those able to make ends meet, saw the largest increases in 
incidence of arrears.  
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